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Abstract 
Business advisors working in publicly funded enterprise agencies encounter a range of tensions as 
part of their everyday work. These tensions subtly shape how they provide advice and can lead to 
variability in how enterprise policy is delivered on the ground. We explore the competing demands 
facing advisors by inductively analysing advice-giving practices in public sector enterprise 
agencies. We find three overarching drivers of advisor role tension, including: institutional 
demands, client demands and intrinsic demands; seven discrete work tactics advisors deploy to 
navigate these tensions are analysed. From our findings, we develop a theoretical model that 
advances a dynamic understanding of public sector business advice. We conclude by reflecting on 
the structural issues with public sector advising that might constrain the efficacy of advisors.   
Keywords: Business advisors; business support; micro-level; process; enterprise policy; 
implementation 
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Introduction 
 
Business advice, and the role it can play in supporting entrepreneurs, has received 
considerable scholarly attention in recent decades. Previous research has examined a variety of 
advisor-types (Bennett and Robson, 1999), ranging from informal advisors such as family friends 
(Strike, 2013) to professionalised advisors such as consultants (Lambrecht and Pirnay, 2005; 
Schwartz and Bar-El, 2004), business function specialists (Blair and Marcum, 2015; Gooderham 
et al., 2004), and board members (Clarysse et al., 2007; Bennett and Robson, 2004). The 
proliferation of policy-driven enterprise support has however, given rise to a distinctive form of 
advisory professional: the public sector business advisor (PSBA) (Malone, 2012; Mole, 2000). 
These individuals have emerged as central actors within entrepreneurial ecosystems (Feld, 2012; 
Mason and Brown, 2013; Spigel, 2017), delivering enterprise policy objectives ‘on the ground’ 
through a variety of public-facing support agencies (Mole et al., 2017). 
Prior research has predominately sought to evaluate the impact of public sector business 
advice by examining its influence on firm performance, and how this relates to the perceived 
efficacy of wider support initiatives (Mole, 2002a; Mole et al. 2009; Robson and Bennett, 2000). 
Such studies often implicitly conceptualise public sector advisors as ‘cultural dopes’ who 
straightforwardly enact high-level policy directives (Greene et al., 2004). Yet, this overlooks the 
complex environment within which advisors operate and does not adequately reflect the 
knowledge and reflexivity of each individual advisor. As a consequence, we know little about the 
contradictory demands advisors encounter (Mole, 2002a), or the agency they exercise to navigate 
these difficulties as they attempt to deliver on higher-level policy objectives (Arshed et al., 2019). 
Thus, by only minimally problematising the PSBA role (Arshed et al., 2016; Mole, 2002a) we 
argue that scholars have overlooked a critical area of practice that can provide new insights into 
enterprise support more generally. 
Our article focusses on advice-giving, and seeks to extend upon the small body of enterpise 
policy research that addresses implementation analysis (Arshed et al., 2016; Arshed et al., 2019; 
Mole 2002a; Vega et al., 2013). Specifcally, we follow Mole (2002a; 2002b) by drawing on 
Lipsky’s (2010) notion of street-level bureaucracy to explain how high-level policy is adapted to 
further the agenda and interests of varied actors in a policy system, particularly as it moves down 
through organisational or systemic hierarchies. We incorporate recent theory on organisational 
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paradox (Putnam et al., 2016) to explain how and why individuals follow particular courses of 
action.  Our analytical focus is directed towards the most critical part of the policy process; where 
the business advisor directly engages with an entrepreneur to provide support as part of a 
consultation. From this vantage point, we explore two questions. First, what are the sources of role 
tension for business advisors providing this enterprise support; and second, how do advisors 
navigate these tensions through their advice-giving practices? 
To explore these questions, we undertake an in-depth inductive study of practicing business 
advisors. Data collection primarily encompassed semi-structured interviews with 43 respondents 
across three respondent cohorts: i) 16 business advisors operating within the Scottish public sector; 
ii) 17 clients i.e. entrepreneurs or small business owners, who had interacted with these advisory 
services and; iii) 10 respondents who held managerial positions within support bodies. Crucially, 
we mobilised both sides of the advice-giving and receiving dyad in our study; a methodological 
step that is surprisingly rare in studies of advisory practice.  
Our findings identify three categories of tension for business advisors as they advise 
entrepreneurs and small businesses: institutional, client and intrinsic. To resolve competing and 
often paradoxical demands they encounter when providing enterprise support, we identify seven 
tactics drawn upon to achieve a range of outcomes. These are: blurring the boundaries, moulding, 
reframing, reality check, gauging mindset, laying down the law, and distancing. Our study 
contributes to policy implementation studies by developing a dynamic explanation for variations 
in advice-giving. These findings are significant as they open new avenues of debate around how 
business advisory services are designed and managed, and to important questions relating to 
fairness and the equitable distribution of resources by enterprise agencies. 
The article is organised as follows. First, we present an overview of the existing literature 
on the complex role of business advisors and the nature of advice-giving within public sector 
support ecosystems. Second, the qualitative research design is outlined, and findings presented. 
We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of our research, emphasising 
the need to conceptually integrate advice-giving practices more fully into analyses of broader 
enterprise support. 
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Theoretical Background  
 
Advice-giving in a public sector context 
  
            Advice-giving is a fundamentally relational activity, which requires information exchange 
between both sides of the advisor-client dyad (Bennett and Robson, 2005). The intensity and 
regularity of these social exchanges can vary significantly, ranging from multi-interaction personal 
relationships and contractual arrangements (Bennett and Robson, 1999) to one-off ‘fireside chats’ 
(Mole, 2002). Ventures also seek external advice for a wide variety of reasons (Bennett and 
Robson, 2003) though typically advice-seeking relates to ‘business challenges’ that arise during 
particular phases of venture development (Johnson et al., 2007; Webber et al., 2010). 
Consequently, the literature often presents advice-giving as a form of expert knowledge transfer 
through which advisors play an active role in facilitating strategic interventions (Strike, 2012). 
Equally, extant research has highlighted the role that advice can play in engendering intangible or 
‘soft’ impacts on ventures, including reassurance and the reduction of uncertainty (Malone, 2012; 
Ramsden and Bennett, 2005). 
            It is these relational practices that characterise many of the essential processes involved in 
advising. For instance, a considerable body of evidence finds that effective advice-giving is reliant 
on socio-relational factors such as client trust (Bennett and Robson, 2004, 2005; Tan et al., 2016), 
suggesting that communication style and bonding are important complements to tangible strategic 
interventions (Strike, 2013). Relational exchange also resides at the heart of how advice is shaped 
in practice. Diagnosing business challenges, for example, is a key aspect of the advisory role that 
typically requires the facilitation of reflective exchange between advisor and client (Lambrecht 
and Pirnay, 2005; Schwartz and Bar-El, 2004). As such, advisors have been deemed to be 
‘sounding boards’ or ‘critical friends’, who shape support needs in conjunction with client 
feedback (Mole and Keogh, 2009). Such dyadic exchanges can be particularly challenging when 
clients hold critical (Dalley and Hamilton, 2000) or divergent (Miller and Sardais, 2015) 
perspectives on business challenges and associated support needs. A considerable element of 
advice-giving thus encompasses the management of client expectations often with reference to 
how the value of advice is perceived (Wright and Kitay, 2002). 
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While some essential advisory practices are transferrable across different settings, there 
has also been recognition that factors such as advisor type can have a substantial bearing on the 
nature of the role (Strike, 2012). Bennett and Robson (1999), for example, distinguish between 
private‐sector consultancy, business associations, and government support agencies, using 
‘interaction intensity’ as a means to compare advisors that operate in different environments. 
Where studies have focused specifically on PSBAs, findings have indeed highlighted how the 
structural conditions embodied within the public sector setting can impose significant, and often 
competing, demands on the role (Malone, 2012). There are a number of noteworthy considerations 
here: First, unlike private-sector providers, publicly-funded advisory services carry an obligation 
to provide assistance to all who request it (Capelleras et al., 2011). Consequently, studies have 
found that PSBAs can be burdened by unrealistic expectations about the breadth of their expertise 
(Malone, 2012) thus, compelling them to rely on generic advice (Mole 2002). Second, unlike 
commercial practices, public sector advice is typically free-to-use and does not require a 
contractual arrangement. Third, advising in the public sector is subject to the prevailing policy 
objectives at any given time, thus imposing external targets on the role (Malone, 2012). And 
finally, public sector systems typically embody complex organisational structures, which place an 
additional imperative on the PSBA to act as a ‘boundary spanner’ (Spigel, 2017). To better 
conceptualise these competing and often contradictory demands, we turn to research on 
organisational paradoxes. 
 
Managing organisational tensions and paradoxes 
 
Theorising the ways in which individual actors navigate the contradictions, dialectics and 
paradoxes of organisations is a central and enduring concern of scholars (Putnam et al., 2016). It 
is argued that globalisation has contributed to the acceleration of increasingly complex forms of 
organising (Schad et al., 2016); this has led to organisational actors encountering paradoxical 
demands at macro, meso and micro-levels of activity. Examples of these competing forces are 
pervasive and include tensions between profit and purpose (Siegner et al., 2018); ability and 
willingness (Chrisman et al., 2015); and, control and autonomy (Radu-Lefebvre and Randerson, 
2020) within organisations.   
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 Scholars have explored how individual actors navigate these competing organisational 
demands from a range of theoretical perspectives. So for instance, identity theory has been used 
as a lens to understand the nature of tensions within organisational roles (Creed et al., 2010). 
Kreiner et al. (2006) exemplify this when they show how contradictions between individual and 
collective identities are optimally balanced in the context of the Priesthood. Similarly, scholars 
have used institutional logics to conceptualise the manner in which competing demands are 
managed at an organisational level (Reay and Hinings, 2009). Pache and Santos (2013) for 
example, describe a compelling case that outlines tactics and strategies employed by hybrid 
organisations in the social sector to manage competing institutional logics.   
A more systematic framework is advanced by Putnam et al. (2016), who develop a 
‘constitutive’ approach for explaining organisational tensions. Their theory integrates various 
metatheoretical perspectives to understand ways in which “contradictions, dialectics, and 
paradoxes come into being through discourse and social interactions, draw from socio-historical 
conditions, co-exist with multiple tensions across diverse organisational levels, and signal 
struggles for meaning among multiple actors or groups” (Putnam et al., 2016, p. 122). The 
empirical focus on organisational discourse and the interactions between key stakeholders 
therefore enable scholars to observe both the emergence and resolution of organisational 
contradictions and illuminate the reasons as to why these particular solutions were adopted. 
  Returning to our research context, which examines business advisors within a complex 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, we find only a fragmented understanding of the unique pressures facing 
advisors and the mitigating strategies they adopt (Malone, 2012; Mole, 2002b). The 
microfoundational dynamics of advice-giving have only received limited attention (Strike, 2013, 
who develops a grounded model of advice-giving in a family business context) and scholars have 
focussed more on outcomes of advice (Chatterji et al., 2019) or on the legitimacy of consulting 
advice itself (Wright and Kitay, 2002). We therefore, propose to integrate Lipsky’s (1980) bottom-
up approach to policy analysis and Putnam et al.’s (2016) praxis-oriented approach to 
organisational paradox to examine how tensions are experienced and resolved ‘on the ground’ 
through everyday interactions in the business advising context. Given that advice-giving is the 
critical locus of activity within this context, we direct our empirical focus towards this practice 
and ask: 
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RQ1: What are the drivers of role tension encountered by public sector business advisors? 
RQ2: What tactics do public sector business advisors adopt to manage these tensions through their 
advice-giving practices? 
 
Methodology 
 
Research aims 
 
To explore how business advisors negotiate competing role demands we 
investigate the practice of advising as it is experienced and understood by three relevant groups 
(advisors, clients, and managers). We employed an interpretivist theory-building approach, which 
sought to both bring order to the diverse worldviews of relevant individual respondents (Jennings 
et al., 2005) and to shape a coherent conceptual explanation of the phenomenon under study (Gioia 
and Pitre, 1990; Gioia et al., 2013). Key aspects of the methodological approach are detailed below, 
beginning with a description of the research context. 
 
Research context 
 
Our study focused on public sector business advisors operating in economic 
development agencies in Scotland, UK. Scotland has a well-developed entrepreneurial ecosystem 
which encompasses a wide variety of support channels (Scotland CAN DO, 2019; Scottish 
Enterprise, 2019). At the heart of this ecosystem are three key economic agencies: Business 
Gateway, Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise. Business advice for start-
ups is provided by Business Gateway in Scotland. This has approximately 170 business advisors 
operating through 53 offices spread across Scotland. In 2018-201, these advisors supported 9,000 
new business starts and a further 3,000 existing SMEs (Business Gateway, 2019). In mainland 
Scotland, growth support is provided by Scottish Enterprise who receive annual funding of £290 
million to deliver a portfolio of economic development services (Scottish Enterprise, 2018). One 
of their services supports approximately 2,000 companies who receive on-going advice from 
around 100 business advisors (Brown and Mason, 2012). In the Highlands and Islands, growth 
support is provided by Highlands and Islands Enterprise, who receive annual public funding to the 
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tune of £64 million, £22 million of which is spent on business advisory services for approximately 
550 clients annually (Highlands and Islands Enterprise, 2019). Advice is provided at no cost to the 
individual or business and services feed into a pipeline of other free-to-use support sources offered 
both internally and by partner agencies. 
 
Sample and respondent selection 
 
As our analysis of the literature notes, the designation ‘business advisor’ potentially 
captures a wide variance of roles, ranging from public sector actors and private sector consultants 
to specific functions (e.g. accountants) and generalist guidance. As such, it was important that our 
study used clear respondent selection parameters, which reflected the particular type of business 
advisor that we aimed to investigate. Specifically, we focused on business advisors that adhered 
to all of the following criteria: first, they worked in a public sector organisation that was 
responsible for ‘on the ground’ implementation of wider governmental enterprise support policies; 
second, their role was chiefly concerned with supporting new and young ventures; third, they 
worked in a ‘front line’ advisory role, which principally involved direct interaction with clients 
(e.g. founders) and; fourth, their role emphasised provision of general support and was not limited 
to a specific business function (e.g. legal, finance etc.). 
A purposive sampling approach was employed, the aim of which was to recruit informants 
that were directly instructive to our specific research enquiry rather than to develop a representative 
sample of all public sector business advisors. We gathered our sample of respondents by leveraging 
networks between our research team and Scotland’s enterprise support ecosystem, restricting our 
search to advisors that worked in government-funded agencies. Our rationale was to maintain a 
degree of consistency in the institutional settings within which our respondent advisors operated. 
We recognise the likelihood of localised micro-variances in organisational context. Nonetheless, 
we believe that our broad geographical and organisation-type restrictions, coupled with our explicit 
respondent selection parameters, provide a basis for meaningful comparison across respondent 
experiences. In total, we recruited 16 business advisors to take part in the study. 
When designing the methodology, we were cognisant of the limitations associated with 
prior studies that empirically mobilise only one side of the advisory relationship. As such, we 
recruited a cohort of 17 clients, all whom had interacted with the services offered by our advisor 
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cohort. Finally, we gathered an additional sample of 10 respondents who held managerial positions 
within the relevant support bodies. These individuals were able to offer pertinent insights into the 
wider institutional influences that impacted the advisor role. Our final sample contained 43 
respondents across these three cohorts. Respondent cohort descriptions and corresponding data 
sources are summarised in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Data collection 
 
Data collection primarily consisted of in-depth semi-structured interviews with all 
respondents. Interviews were conducted between January 2017 and November 2019 and were 
typically 60 minutes in length. The interview protocol consisted of open-ended questions, which 
were designed to prompt conversation and enable us to pursue emergent lines of enquiry (Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009). Interviews were characterised by three primary lines of questioning. 
Firstly, we focused on the aspects of process that defined the role, probing respondents for their 
understanding of task demands and sequences. Respondent’s general understanding of advice-
giving as a practice was explored; we probed for their views on what makes effective or ineffective 
support. We then investigated the specific experiences of advisors; asking about, for example, 
typical, positive, negative, or challenging interactions with clients. Furthermore, we triangulated 
these qualitative perspectives with a range of documentary evidence that was relevant to an 
understanding of the advisor role. Secondary data sources included job specifications, training 
manuals, and performance targets. Interviews with clients followed a similar, but slightly 
narrower, protocol which focused chiefly on client-side experiences of being advised. Again, this 
included reflections on their experience of the process, as well as on the practice of advising more 
generally. Interviews with managers, meanwhile, principally emphasised design of the job role, 
and on the wider pressures that characterised it.  
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Data analysis 
 
We adopted an inductive approach to analysis, which emphasised first-order coding of the 
data, followed by subsequent thematic organisation of codes into a conceptual explanation of the 
phenomenon (Gioia et al., 2013). To commence ordering of the data, we first sought to develop an 
ostensive understanding of the business advisor role. To do this, we initially utilised secondary 
data pertaining to the role, including job specifications and training manuals. Analysis of these 
helped us to acquire an appreciation of key tasks and processes, as well as of other wider 
expectations, pressures, and parameters. 
Next, we interrogated this understanding against the experiences of individual respondents 
in each of our three cohorts. We began by constructing individual narratives for each of the 
business advisors in our sample, detailing their views on the practices that they undertook. Next, 
we triangulated these with evidence from client and manager experiences, thus developing an 
understanding of how various stakeholder exchanges influence advisory practices. These 
narratives served to identify incongruities between formalised understanding of the role and the 
lived experience of practitioners. This, in turn, led to our first round of inductive coding, which 
focused on the various pressures that exemplify the PSBA role. Initially, we developed first order 
codes from individual respondent experiences, before comparing emerging analytical labels 
against one another in what amounted to a form of ‘cross case’ analysis (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). This process allowed us to look for replication as well as to refine the codes that 
characterised our emerging conceptualisation. Figure 1 outlines the coding structure that we used 
to identify characteristic institutional, client, and intrinsic pressures. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Subsequent stages of the analysis examined the work undertaken by advisors in response 
to these pressures. This was achieved by isolating evidence from specific advisor-client exchanges 
and pinpointing different types of advisory practices undertaken. This included analysis of how, 
why, and in what circumstances those practices were carried out. We focused particularly on the 
different tactics deployed to reconcile role tensions and then constructed chains of related 
interactions, which allowed us to develop an understanding of the interplays between advisor 
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tactics and the sources of pressure encountered. It was this analytical process that guided the 
development of our conceptual model (Figure 2), which depicts the dynamic management of the 
PSBA role, and in turn, forms the basis for our findings and associated theoretical contributions. 
 
Findings 
 
In our findings section we report on the key concepts that emerged from our inductive 
analysis. These findings are split into two sections. The first answers RQ1, which seeks to elicit 
the causes of role tension experienced by business advisors. The second section answers RQ2, 
which aims to understand how advisors navigate these tensions through their advice-giving 
practices. 
 
Drivers of role tension in public sector business advising 
 
We open by outlining the factors that shape public sector business advice-giving, focusing 
specifically on the institutional, client, and intrinsic pressures that emerged from our analysis. How 
each of these three categories is associated with a set of role demands that can come into conflict, 
creating specific tensions that must be resolved by the advisor is explored. Understanding the 
dynamics of these tensions provides some insight as to why there is variability in advice-giving 
and offers a novel explanation for why particular forms of advice-giving are pursued in this 
context.  
 
Institutional 
Like many managerial bureaucracies, a central feature of publicly funded business support 
services is a focus on performance targets and accountability. Given the significant public 
investment in business support, there is a strong pressure to deliver ‘value for money,’ or to at least 
give the impression of so doing. This is a purposive and somewhat cynical distinction, and one we 
encountered with some frequency when speaking to advisors and their managers. Our interviewees 
identified a clear division between activity and measurement, explaining that although something 
may count towards a job target, it does not, in reality, always reflect a meaningful interaction: 
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“So, part of it is about the number of one-to-ones we’ve had. We have an agreed target for 
that every year, and that’s fine. I mean, I don’t know what that tells anyone. It just means 
I’ve had a coffee with someone… We’ve met the requirements of the funding, yes. And 
there are others, like number of workshops and number of students touched through 
workshops. But what I find interesting is that’s always the issue with metrics - they are 
always distilled down into the quantitative issues and not qualitative issues. I think that’s 
one of the difficulties that besets this whole area” (A6). 
 
This top-down target-focussed culture, largely driven by the ways in which some business 
support agencies bid for tenders to secure public funding, is often considered by advisors to be 
anathema to ‘doing the job’ properly. The volume of entrepreneurs that individual advisors are 
expected to consult with, is considered very high by those same advisors, and this invariably shapes 
the nature of the client relationship: 
 
“The contract is quite target driven. So, we have to support so many start-ups, so many 
early-stage growth, so many discretionary appointments, so many GAS [Growth Advisory 
Services] appointments. Our contract manager in [our town] is on the case and making sure 
we are hitting targets. She likes [our region] to be up there in terms of hitting targets which 
is fair enough. So, we do all that, but it leaves us unable to spend a lot of time with clients” 
(A16). 
 
Accountability is again emphasised by advisors as a key constraint, as they have to 
carefully justify the resources they allocate to clients. There is an emphasis on process 
standardisation in order that client companies in different parts of the country are not perceived to 
have access to an unfair advantage (e.g. through obtaining generous grants others are not offered). 
Clients are therefore, usually filtered for support, normally based on turnover, employee 
headcount, growth potential and other similar factors. Such fixed parameters reduce the agency of 
individual advisors, their ability to tailor services and their scope to follow their own advice-giving 
instincts.  
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Advisors must also respond to evolving government policy initiatives, which at the time of 
our data collection in Scotland involved an encompassing focus on ‘inclusive growth.’ This was 
perceived to add a further limitation to the scope of advice-giving in a public sector context: 
 
“I guess it’s quite new this year but it’s a huge focus for us, is inclusive growth. So, I think 
that’s a huge value that underpins everything that we do now. We don’t do anything without 
asking the important questions, of, well: how does this make opportunities for everyone, 
and those that need it the absolute most across Scotland?” (M3). 
 
Advisors are expected to operate according to a public sector ethos, pursuing an outcome 
that is both good for their client and good for the broader economy. This often poses challenges to 
the personal integrity of advisors as they navigate the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Given the focus 
on meeting targets, there is a tension between partner public sector business advisory organisations 
(who perhaps offer more specialised or niche services than our interviewees), as:  “when you start 
developing metrics for public sector... quasi-public sector organisations, is that sometimes 
organisations want to hold on to your business so they can claim it as theirs the whole way through 
the process...at a certain point there are better people to advise them than X [agency name]” (A6). 
Thus, advisors often face a difficult decision around when to pass on clients, particularly if it 
reduces their personal ability to meet a target.  
 
Client 
The varying nature of client expectations was a factor that appeared to impose considerable 
pressures on PSBAs. In many circumstances, negative client expectations were borne out of 
experience, where a previous interaction with a public sector advisory service had coloured future 
expectancy. Our analysis of client data suggests that advisory services were often treated with 
some disdain, being considered as either an impediment, or necessary evil, on the path to securing 
funding or support. We found this presented a direct challenge to the self-worth of the business 
advisor, casting their role as more of a lower-order administrator than as a knowledgeable 
consultant. Indeed, poor external awareness of the scope of the business advisor role led to 
misaligned expectations as to what the business advisor could ultimately do: 
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“The question I get asked an awful lot is ‘do you think this is a good idea; do you think this 
can work?’ And my standard response is ‘Well, I can’t actually… you are the person that 
will know this and we can give you the tools that you need to figure that out for yourself’” 
(A5). 
 
This misalignment is most pronounced where clients assume it is the role of the business 
advisor to do parts of their work for them. Taking the notion of support quite literally, they expect 
the business advisor to complete time-consuming and firm-specific tasks such as developing a 
business plan or producing company financials: 
 
“Others come in and they’ve got really high expectations and they think you’ve got a big 
pot of money to give them money. They’re expecting you to do things for them. Don’t tell 
me how to write a business plan. Write my business plan for me and things like that” (A4). 
 
Many of these challenges appear to relate to the vast diversity in both the type of companies 
that seek advice and the form of support they require. Unlike other commercial business 
consultants, who either provide a specialised service (e.g. tax advice, supply chain management 
etc.) or work in specific sectors (e.g. oil and gas), public sector business advisors must be prepared 
to work with any qualifying organisation; from micro-firms to high-growth ventures and from the 
creative sector to hi-tech. This breadth reduces the likelihood that the generalist advisor will be 
able to offer meaningful advice (in the view of the client), and we identified this as a factor that 
led to advisors downplaying the status of their role: 
 
“Yes, the job title is Business Adviser, but as anybody would know who’s done this kind 
of work, you can’t advise very much. You can signpost, but when it gets very technical, 
when it becomes very specialist, you’ve got to find people out there who can help develop 
this business and the diversity of the businesses that I work with is astonishing” (A3). 
 
Coupled with this, we found that clients often struggle to articulate their support needs to 
advisors, meaning that expectations are not always readily apparent. Our analysis examined a 
range of circumstances where clients engaged advisors with highly complex, nebulous, or 
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deliberately open support enquires, thus placing a significant interpretive burden on the advisor in 
terms of how they shaped their intervention approach. 
These factors contributed to what were fairly harsh external evaluation of the public sector 
business advisor role from stakeholders, particularly where clients either: overestimated how easy 
it was to obtain funding and/or actionable support; considered the advisor to be unnecessarily 
interfering in their operations; or, otherwise diminished the role of business advisor as they were 
perceived to lack specialised knowledge that would be useful to the firm. 
 
Intrinsic 
Our final role pressure, which we have categorised as intrinsic, is one that has rarely been 
acknowledged in past literature relating to public sector business advisors. This label describes the 
internal motivations for providing forms of advice to clients. While all business advisors, both in 
the public sector and private sector, have the overarching goal of helping clients, the ways in which 
they do so are shaped in part by a range of individual factors. The most obvious factor shaping 
motivations to provide advice is personal reward. While the business model for most consultancy 
organisations (e.g. management consultants, financial consultants) is for advisors to secure a client 
and then expand the range of services offered to them (thus, increasing billable hours), this does 
not transfer across to the public sector, where the role is often about rationing services or passing 
a client on to another more relevant agency. Likewise, PSBAs do not receive financial rewards for 
doing a good job and this explained why they sought to engage in forms of advice-giving that 
instead boosted their esteem within the their community. The primary means of doing so was to 
be seen to discover ‘sexy’ ventures that went on to success and win awards: 
 
“So, he was accepted into [the] growth [program]… he won a [high profile] award, so had 
just over £100,000 from [Organisation A]. And he has now developed a second product. 
And he’s just won the [prestigious] award for innovation and again… so that’s rewarding 
because this was a guy, he’s got a little unit out in [Town C] Business Centre, him and his 
partner, and things are really going to happen for him… he’s been put forward for account 
management because lots of things are going on with him and there’s been quite a bit of 
interest, but clever guy. But that’s rewarding, to take somebody that was working away in 
his little unit, doing his thing, coming up with this clever idea, to then see that idea actually 
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go live, go off onto a facility. It’s not just an idea, it’s actually going to go to 
commercialisation and he will have a very successful business behind that. So, you can’t 
do that anywhere else, see that sort of progression” (A2).  
 
This desire to become part of the success story of prestigious firms was common, and we 
found that it influenced the advisory approach adopted. Despite the bureaucratic constraints of the 
public advisory system, we found advisors more willing to use their own personal agency to fight 
for special support for firms they perceived as promising (in some cases where the firm did not fit 
within the parameters for particular packages of support): 
 
“So, it is identifying in the X [agency name] that these exceptional ones, I mean some of 
the X [agency name] will never see them, they’re few and far between. But when they 
come along it’s about spotting them and realising that the strategy for these ones is 
different” (M6). 
 
Finally, there is also a sense of pride in the ability to help a wide range of clients. Many 
advisors derived self-worth from their ability to work with a challenging set of organisations. The 
motivation to help, and ‘do the right thing’ for clients was pervasive: 
 
“It is a job that dealing with clients is fantastic, because you never know who you are going 
to get. The different variety of businesses you deal with is always challenging and it 
challenges you to get out of your comfort zone” (A9). 
 
Thus, our findings suggest a clear distinction between the intrinsic motivations of 
commercial business advisory services and those working for a fixed salary in the public sector. 
 
What advice-giving tactics do advisors use to manage role tensions? 
 
For our second research question, we seek to uncover the tactics that individual advisors 
use to balance the competing institutional, client and intrinsic demands that come with operating 
in the public sector. We do so by orienting to the interactional practices in which advisors engage 
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through the course of their everyday work, to understand how advice-giving is shaped by both 
individual and contextual factors.  We identify seven distinct tactics that are used to resolve a 
range of commonplace advisor role tensions. In Table 2, we outline the nature of each tension, the 
conflicting antecedents and the specific behaviour(s) adopted to navigate the tension.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Blurring the Boundaries: Our first tactic was used by advisors to deal with the bureaucratic 
- and at times relatively blunt - filtering of client firms into different streams that were eligible for 
financial and business support. Where the advisor felt there was growth potential for a firm that 
had perhaps been unfairly overlooked (in the view of the client and advisors), the advisor used 
their social capital and knowledge of the system to procure some form of resources (even if not  
equivalent to the desired support). Operating in this ‘grey area’ was not an everyday occurrence 
but nevertheless, remained an important option for advisors to pursue in order to ‘do the right 
thing’ for their clients, and partially to save face: 
 
“If it is really bad news, this client isn’t getting anything then I will meet with him this 
afternoon and apologise profusely on behalf of the whole enterprise network and then look 
and see what we can do... There might be a bit of local funding, we might be able to swing 
something” (A15). 
 
We observed this tactic being used in cases where prescriptive rules were preventing what 
advisors believed were ‘common sense’ decisions, and where the advisor had significant 
experience or social connections within the advising organisation. 
 
Moulding: A key pressure on business advisors is that they must achieve a wide range of 
KPIs. This often conflicts, however, with the breadth of businesses supported and the awareness 
clients have of how public sector advising works. Many client businesses are naïve as to how they 
should present themselves to the advisory organisation for the most optimal outcome. This can 
have consequences. For example, a business may play down their venture growth aspirations, 
which can lead to them being miscategorised. We identify this as a particular issue in Scotland, 
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where our empirical material was collected, and where there is a cultural tendency towards 
modesty and underselling of personal business aspirations. This is a source of frustration for 
advisors, as they cannot categorise such businesses as potential ‘growth’ businesses as clients are 
not communicating the ‘correct’ mindset, or put more fundamentally, they are not saying the 
‘right’ thing to trigger support. We found advisors attempting to coax out the desired answer, partly 
by adopting a somewhat provocative approach to shape behaviour: 
 
“She said to me, ‘Why haven’t I got a one-to-one business adviser?’  I said, ’Well what’s 
your turnover aspirations?’ She laughed and she said, ‘Just holiday money’. I said, ‘Well 
there’s your answer’. I work with businesses who are expecting a turnover of £70,000... 
She emailed me back the next day and said ‘I’ve done myself a disservice. I could easily 
do that turnover and I would really like to talk to you more about this’. So, I guess there is 
an element of the start-up advisors very much need to learn how to get it out of people to 
encourage people to think big” (A4). 
 
Reframing: Business advisors in our sample reported that some clients exhibited a form of 
dependency on the business advisory organisation and the individual advisor. Although no specific 
advisor directly complained about this to us, we inferred their frustration when clients expected 
them to solve their problems for them (as opposed to with them). Hence, we observed a set of 
activities that we categorise as ‘reframing’ tactics, and these were largely used to make clients 
realise they are capable, and indeed responsible, for addressing their own issues: 
 
“I think start-up clients come in and expect you to instruct them, you have to do this, you 
have to do this and you have to that. There is an element of that, but… an example of that 
is someone will come in and say should I be a sole trader, or should I form a limited 
company? And I say, well, it is up to you! I say you have to figure out how you expect the 
business to grow, think about if you are going to borrow money, if you are going to take 
on premises. We let them come to the conclusion themselves” (A11). 
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From the entrepreneur/client perspective, we found that the deployment of this tactic 
contributed to the perception of advisors as unhelpful, as their expectation of ‘advice’ was to 
receive more concrete guidance that allowed them to be more passive in the relationship. 
 
Reality check: An important tactic for advisors is to manage expectations quickly following 
initial meetings with clients. Advisors noted that services are often publicly advertised (e.g. in the 
press, on billboards) in a manner that leads entrepreneurs and small businesses believing they will 
have easy access to money: 
 
“People are expecting handouts...there’s nothing in particular that they are doing… haven’t 
identified anything new….they just feel that they should get something because you’re the 
council, or you’re X [agency name] and they see adverts and you say you’ll help 
businesses” (A13). 
 
We found many advisors therefore adopted a relatively robust approach to provide clients 
with a ‘reality check’ based on their unique circumstances: 
 
“I had a client the other day who was looking - quite small business, potential for growth 
but quite small at the moment - who thought they could get their salary paid because they 
were going to be like the international manager. And we’re like ‘no that’s not how it works, 
the system is that you are the business owner and you are employing someone to do this 
role, you can’t get…’ and they said ‘that’s just crap, we’ve done this, that…’ and I was like 
‘yes but you think about it this is public sector money’” (A2).  
 
Given business advising in the public sector is something of a volume business, requiring 
efficient handling of clients; we found advisors were less keen to ‘sugar-coat’ negative messages. 
This directness, which would not necessarily be found in advising settings where clients are 
paying, often by the hour, is relatively specific to contexts where advice is rationed. 
 
Gauging Mindset: Advisors have a range of support packages or ‘products’ they can offer 
clients and are targeted against identifying companies that are suitable for these. It is important 
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therefore, that at a very early stage, the advisor can screen these businesses to get a feel for how 
they will develop. This informal future forecasting tactic is perhaps the practice that relies most on 
the individual skill and instinct of the advisor, as they typically arrange a set of early informal 
meetings to gauge mindset: 
 
“So, the way that we get them, is we get referrals, they go through a kind of informal 
assessment process, which is generally me kind of having a meeting with a cup of coffee… 
I’m trying to get a feel of the entrepreneur, because that’s really important here. If he hasn’t 
got the real mind-set and ambition to build an international company of scale from the 
outset, he’s just not for us. It doesn’t mean he’s bad, he’s just not for us” (M6). 
 
This early intervention provides an effective means of addressing tension between resource 
scarcity and the need to make sure the small number of high-potential firms are adequately 
serviced: “Obviously there are some we spend more time with, growth advisory and growth 
pipeline we do spend more with” (A16). 
 
Laying down the law: A major frustration for advisors is that they spend time working with 
a client to secure access to resources and support, and then the client fails to engage further after 
they secure a package of help. This causes problems for the advisor as it affects objective 
measurements of their professional performance, and many advisors perceive it to signal a lack of 
respect for their relationship and role as advisor (i.e. they feel used and their self-worth is 
diminished). One of the managers we spoke to through our interview characterised the tactic we 
term laying down the law, as they effectively ‘forewarned’ prospective participants on a 
specialised growth program that they were in a privileged position and should behave accordingly: 
 
“Our advisers know the kinds of businesses that we’re looking for, those ones that have 
got the potential for scale and growth, so it might be that they first of all introduce us. I 
generally will be the one that meets with companies before they apply to give them an idea 
of what to expect, what we’d be looking for from them, and just to ensure that we manage 
expectations at that stage” (M7). 
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For the entrepreneurs, they frequently object to committing time to workshops and 
meetings that are usually conditional for receiving particular forms of financial support. They often 
view the interventions as either ‘beneath them’ or irrelevant. Hence, the laying down the law tactic, 
while appearing almost discourteous, is important for minimising the risk of disengagement by 
filtering out those who are only interested in hard resources and not the full packages of support.  
 
Distancing: We encountered a common tactic used by advisors to protect themselves from 
some of the stigma associated with public sector business advisory organisations more generally. 
Recognising that support is rationed and conditional, and that the bureaucratic rules and funding 
parameters often prevent many companies from receiving adequate support, advisors adopt a form 
of distancing from their organisation to protect or enhance their own self-esteem. They did this 
either by criticising the organisation by for example, through a conspiratorial ‘you know what they 
are like’ gesture) or alternatively, by going ‘above and beyond’ for the client, supporting them in 
ways that are in excess of their perceived role requirements. As one entrepreneur noted: 
 
“My X [agency name] advisor is fantastic…she is going above and beyond her normal role 
for some of the things that she is doing for us, and people that she's connecting us with. 
Like she called her sister to ask her sister's boss to get a chat with me, he's the owner of [a 
well-known clothing brand], and little things like that I know she doesn't have to do” (E15). 
 
In so doing, the advisor overcomes the constraints of the role, which diminishes their 
esteem and enables them to recover some self-worth by satisfying the client, even though they will 
not be rewarded formally through their organisation.  
 
The dynamic negotiation of the public sector advisor role 
 
So far, our description of the tactics used by public sector business advisors to navigate 
role tensions has relied upon evidence from specific standalone advisor-client interactions. In 
reality however, the evolving nature of role demands and resolutions is more accurately exhibited 
through processes encompassed within nested chains of exchanges that occur over time. When 
these exchanges take place, the tactics employed by advisors feed back into and update client, 
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institutional, and innate pressures in a dynamic manner. This dynamic interplay between tensions 
and advisor tactics thus characterise the often-delicate process of negotiating an advisory role in 
this organisational context. We build upon the constructs that emerged through our inductive 
theory-building to present this dynamic process in a conceptual model that addresses our focal 
research questions (Figure 2). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
It is important to reiterate that client, institutional, and intrinsic pressures often act in 
competition with one another, resulting in tensions that elicit distinctive forms of advisor agency. 
In some circumstances, these tensions can be relatively unique to a particular advisor-client 
exchange. More often, however, certain tensions present themselves consistently (and 
continuously) over time across a variety of advice-giving interactions. When this happens, these 
can emerge to become reified characteristics of the role. Our findings demonstrate a number of 
these common entrenched tensions in action, with perhaps the archetypal example being the 
paradoxical relationship between ‘doing a good job’/‘servicing the client’s needs’ and ‘meeting 
targets’/‘box-ticking’. 
Our model is also, however, designed to reflect the inherently relational and interactive 
nature of advice-giving. As such, our conceptualisation recognises that clients play an active role 
in shaping how advisory practices are carried out. When advisors perform their role (i.e. deploy 
tactics), clients will typically for example, react with some form of judgement as to the merits of 
an interaction. We conceptualise these judgements in the client exchange and feedback loop. While 
the specific nature of client judgements may vary significantly, they are most often, but not always, 
centred on the perceived usefulness of the advice given. In some cases, client judgements are 
lengthy and considered; captured for example, in a series of interactions that occur during and 
following the implementation of advice. In other circumstances, assessments are based more on 
snap judgements; i.e., the merits of advice are judged without efforts undertaken to utilise it. On 
some occasions, assessments of merit are analytical, whereas others appear to be rooted in socio-
psychological factors, for example, the client liked or did not like the way that the advisor 
communicated or acted. Ultimately, it is the continual and cumulative updating of these 
judgements that feeds back into client pressures and thus, on to future advisor practices. 
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We argue that this recurring interplay between client judgement and advisor action 
characterises the negotiation of expectations between the parties. As our empirical evidence 
repeatedly suggests, discrepancies between client and advisor expectations are a defining feature 
of the role. Thus, one of the key challenges for the advisor is to reconcile this gap in some fashion. 
In many circumstances, the advisor, unable to fully address complex and specific client challenges, 
must instead reframe them so that some form of achievable task can be carved out and ultimately, 
allows the client to get something useful out of the exchange. However, our analysis also identifies 
cases where the expectations gap between client and advisor becomes irreconcilable. In these 
circumstances, we note evidence of clients that have disengaged from the advisor, or worse, openly 
disparaged the service by spreading negative judgements to others. Equally though, we note that 
some clients are able to adjust their expectations strategically, developing a deeper understanding 
of the pressures that advisors operate under in order to effectively utilise them as a conduit for 
resource access. 
We find similar interplay between advisor action and the institutional pressures present in 
this context. This interplay is characterised in how institutional alignment is managed. While it is 
clear that institutional pressures place significant restrictions on advisory practices, it is also 
abundantly evident that advisors are capable of exercising various forms agency within the 
confines of these restrictions, reflecting Lipsky’s (2010) subversive ‘street-level bureaucrat.’ This 
observation highlights several interesting, and often paradoxical, scenarios in terms of how 
institutional alignment is negotiated. An advisor might, for example, deploy tactics that misalign 
with institutional performance assessments, but that actually serve a particular client more 
effectively. Conversely, an advisor’s actions might be well-aligned to institutional expectations, 
but not particularly well received by the client. As such, at all times, the public sector business 
advisor must be cognisant of how and when to balance these competing forces through the tactics 
they employ. 
 
Discussion 
 
While prior research has gone some way to outlining the complex role of the PSBA (Mole, 
2002a, 2002b), the everyday work of these advisors has rarely taken centre stage. Instead, scholars 
have predominantly focussed on measuring the efficacy of policy, with the consequence that issues 
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around implementation have been minimised (Fotopoulos and Storey, 2019). In our article we 
argue that this imbalance should be rectified. Studies from the field of political science show that 
policies are rarely implemented as intended (Weatherley and Lipsky, 1977), and so, measuring the 
notional success or failure of a policy requires more than quantitatively evaluating outcomes in 
order to get a sense of the full picture. To understand why policy diverges from intentions, we 
direct attention towards an important nexus of enterprise policy and the entrepreneur – the business 
advisor consultation. Here, we inductively analyse the competing factors that lead to advisors 
implementing variable forms of advice, and most significantly, we identify for the first time a set 
of advice-giving tactics that advisors employ to navigate the paradoxical tensions they encounter 
in their role. By bringing analysis down to the level of interaction between entrepreneur and 
advisor, we provide the basis for a more practice-oriented and performative theory of enterprise 
policy. In so doing, we overcome weaknesses that arise with treating enterprise policy as an 
abstract entity rather than as something that is constituted in and through the actions of 
stakeholders (Lipsky, 1980). Through these findings we can begin to see some of the structural 
issues with public sector business advising that may be limiting the efficacy of this economic 
development approach. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
Our study extends previous research that has examined the practice of advice-giving 
(Nikolova et al., 2009; Strike, 2013). While there is a relatively well-developed sociological 
understanding of how advice is both given and received in a range of contexts, including legal 
(McGinniss, 2018) and scientific settings (Hayat et al., 2015), we illustrate several ways in which 
public sector business advising is particular. For example, while literature on consultancy 
relationships is instructive for our study, there are distinctive antecedents in the enterprise support 
context that radically alter how and why advice is given. Our first theoretical contribution 
highlights that unlike most other forms of formal business advice that entrepreneurs and other 
small businesses seek; there is no financial cost to them for doing so. This profoundly changes the 
dynamic between advisor and client and leads to a range of surprising advisory tactics that we 
would not necessarily expect to see in a private sector relationship; for example,  it would be 
unlikely to see a commercial consultant ‘laying down the law’ with a paying client, nor using 
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‘reframing’ tactics to get clients to solve their own problems, leading to reduced revenue for the 
consultant. This notion of developing resilience in clients, with the hope that they do not develop 
dependency on the advisory service, underlines the different motivations of private and 
commercial settings, where advice-giving would often be designed purposively to create further 
engagement and revenue. 
Another intriguing aspect of the public sector business advisor role is that advisors are 
gatekeepers for significant financial and non-financial resources. This adds a particular tension to 
the advice-giving process, as advisors are acutely aware some clients are only engaging in the 
advising relationship so they can access these resources, rather than the advisor’s expertise. 
Advisors often managed this negative esteem signal by downplaying their own professional status, 
even to the extent where, as we reported in our findings: “the job title is Business Adviser, but as 
anybody would know who’s done this kind of work, you can’t advise very much” (A3). While we 
note in the literature that many private sector consultants recognise the tenuous legitimacy of their 
own knowledge claims (Bouweester and Stiekema, 2015) and respond by (over) emphasising their 
credentials and impact (Wright and Kitay, 2002) or using “storytelling, rhetorical skills, and 
charisma to reduce interpretative variety and convey the symbolic meaning of a highly complex 
product” (Nikolova et al., 2009: p. 295), we extend theoretical understanding of this dynamic in 
the public sector by showing public sector advisors take a contrasting approach through ‘talking 
down’ and ‘simplifying’ what they do.  
Our second theoretical contribution builds further on the work of Mole (2000a, 2000b), 
who first identified some of the tensions that exist in entrepreneur-advisor relationships. We do so 
by integrating the constitutive theory of organisational paradox (Putnam et al., 2016) with theories 
of business advice (Malone, 2012; Mole, 2002; Strike, 2013) and policy implementation analysis 
(Lipsky, 1980). We extend Mole’s (2000b) static snapshot of entrepreneur-advisor tensions by 
developing a dynamic model (Figure 2) that shows the inter-related and recursive nature of 
tensions and response tactics. In adopting this approach, we emphasise the agency, albeit 
sometimes limited, of business advisors and show how and under what circumstances this agency 
is activated. We further extend Mole’s (2000b) work by adding depth to understanding of the 
sources of tension, particularly focussing on the nature of intrinsic factors. This is shown to be a 
powerful determining factor in advisors opting to deviate from institutional constraints, as they 
either elect to build esteem by exceeding role expectations in the view of the client, or are guided 
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by an inherent public sector ethos that justifies ‘bending the rules’ to do the right thing for their 
client. We argue this ‘grey area,’ where advisors operate beyond the notional boundary of their 
role, is a key reason why the advising process generally works amidst the paradoxical tension 
encountered in this environment. 
Our work underscores Lipsky’s (2010) claim that ‘street-level’ public sector workers who 
make on-the-spot decisions to benefit or sanction clients constitute the true face of public policy. 
Consequently, in our article we have advanced a conceptual explanation for how enterprise policy 
is crystallised in practice through entrepreneur-advisor encounters. 
 
Practical Implications 
 
Taking this fundamental insight, that policy becomes ‘real’ during social interaction, then 
it is possible to rethink some aspects of the current system of advising. For example, policymakers 
and enterprise agencies may consider taking a different approach to managing and motivating 
advisors. As our study shows ‘esteem’ and ‘integrity’ are key sources of tension, typically coming 
into opposition with bureaucratic rules that prevent advisors providing an optimal outcome for 
clients, and from a client’s lack of respect for the limited scope of advice-giving advisors are 
empowered to offer. This notion of job status has been an ongoing issue in implementation studies 
(Hjalmarsson and Johansson, 2003), and our findings suggest that addressing this source of conflict 
directly could unlock associated difficulties relating to advice-giving in this context. For example, 
we show that a ‘public sector ethos’, which prioritises ‘doing the right thing’ is a dominant feature 
of this context, and therefore, we speculate that providing more autonomy for advisors, and 
reducing some of the narrow reporting obligations, may lead to more empowering outcomes for 
advisors and clients. 
A second implication is that our focus on ‘street-level bureaucracy’ and the dynamics of 
advising practice may create an opportunity to directly link scholarly research with policymaking 
and organisational design processes. For example, we see an opportunity to work with government 
stakeholders, who typically adopt a top-down approach to policymaking, to highlight some of the 
ground-level dynamics that may lead to unintended outcomes. Additionally, our findings can be 
applied in conjunction with theories of service design (Donetto et al., 2015) to reconfigure advisor 
roles and reform advising services.  
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Limitations and future research 
 
While our research provides a detailed understanding of the work undertaken by public sector 
business advisors, we identify a number of boundary conditions that limit the applicability of our 
theory. Firstly, we urge caution when generalising our findings outside the immediate context. 
While we believe our insights do have relevance beyond our empirical setting, we note specific 
characteristics about the Scottish ecosystem that are not prevalent elsewhere (Mole et al., 2011, 
highlight the regional variations in support provision in England, and Mole and Keogh, 2009, note 
institutional variations between Scotland and England). As our theory implies, these nuanced 
details can specifically influence the nature of advice-giving, and therefore a different set of tactics 
may be used by advisors in other settings where these antecedent factors vary. A second limitation 
of our study is methodological. While our in-depth interviews with multiple stakeholders and 
secondary documentation provide a detailed understanding of entrepreneur-advisor interactions, 
we believe there is a significant opportunity to go beyond this method to conduct a fully situated 
practice-based study. This may entail using video (Hindmarsh and Llewellyn, 2018; Clarke et al., 
2019) or discourse-based methodologies (Locher and Limberg, 2012) to examine advice giving as 
it unfolds, incorporating both verbal and non-verbal actions that advisors utilise to manage 
tensions. Such an approach would help us address a final limitation of the study, which is that we 
treated both advisors and entrepreneurs as relatively homogenous groups. Future studies could 
benefit by analysing and comparing specific patterns of advising across different advisors to 
understand if there are patterns of response tactics used by different groupings of advisor. This, 
we believe, could shed some light on the thorny issue of either conscious or unconscious 
discrimination, which Lipsky (1980, 2010) and others (Giulietti et al., 2019) note is a feature of 
public sector delivery, and which may shape enterprise support outcomes for some groups.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Publicly funded business advisory services, which predominate across many established 
entrepreneurial ecosystems offer free support and access to financial and non-financial resources 
for entrepreneurial firms. Encouragingly, our findings reveal a public sector ethos leads advisors 
to go beyond their remit to ‘do the right thing’ for clients, which in turn provides a general 
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lubrication for the system. Yet this model of enterprise support is not without drawbacks. Through 
our empirical analysis of advisors and advisees, we show how the public sector context generates 
a number of paradoxical demands for advisors, in turn shaping the nature of the advice they 
provide. We offer granular explanation of how these tensions are resolved, through a series of 
advice-giving tactics. By linking specific tensions with response tactics, our research invites 
further research to explain the variations in support received by entrepreneurial firms.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Respondents and data sources 
 
Respondent 
cohort 
Cohort description Data sources 
Advisors All business advisors worked in frontline 
enterprise advisory roles within Scottish public 
services organisations. Role titles varied 
between ‘start-up advisor’, ‘business advisor’, 
and ‘enterprise advisor’. Experience within the 
role ranged between 1 year and 20 years. 
 
For the purposes of this study, advisor 
respondents were designated the labels A1 
through to A16. 
16 semi-structured 
interviews, averaging 60 
mins each; 
Advisor job specifications 
and training manuals; 
Advisor performance 
targets. 
 
Clients Clients were all founding members of firms 
that had sought advice from and interacted 
with advisory services in the same locales as 
the advisor cohort. Firms were all under 10 
years old and reflected a variety of industry 
sectors. 
 
For the purposes of this study, advisor 
respondents were designated the labels E1 
through to E17. 
17 semi-structured 
interviews, averaging 60 
mins each. 
 
Managers All respondents were in managerial positions 
within the support services where business 
advisors worked. 
 
For the purposes of this study, managerial 
respondents were designated the labels M1 
through to M10. 
10 semi-structured 
interviews, averaging 60 
mins each; 
Economic action plans, 
policy documents and 
strategic engagement plans. 
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Figure 1: Data structure (research question 1: competing pressures) 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 2: Tactics for managing role tensions 
Tension Competing Demands 
(Institutional, Client 
and Intrinsic) 
Advisor 
Tactic 
Objective Exemplary Situation 
Promising 
companies would 
benefit from 
support but are 
not qualified to 
receive it. 
Client, Institutional and 
Intrinsic 
Blurring the 
boundaries 
To circumvent overly 
prescriptive 
bureaucratic rules. 
You sort of warn them 
upfront, we’re as diplomatic 
as we can be, and say, to get 
into account management this 
is what, in an ideal world, 
Scottish Enterprise are 
looking for, and they may 
decide that you’re not for 
them. But how we handle that 
is say, if you’re not though, 
we’ll see what other services 
we can provide through our 
routes or through Business 
Gateway. Sometimes 
businesses think they way to 
get all the help is to be 
account managed and then 
you get help from SC. But 
when it boils down to it, 
sometimes the help that SE 
can give, we can replicate 
with our own local 
discretionary services, we’ll 
see if there’s something 
similar that we could do to try 
and mitigate against that sort 
of disappointment. 
Sometimes our local experts 
help or we bring in people 
who could maybe help 
instead of going through a 
specific Scottish Enterprise 
route (A13). 
Companies may 
be eligible for 
support but do 
not present 
themselves in a 
way that 
maximises their 
chance of 
receiving it. 
Institutional, Client Moulding To ensure companies 
say the ‘right thing’ to 
qualify for support. 
We waited until the tender 
was live and then had an 
event to explain it all, and get 
local companies along, so 
there was quite a bit of work 
in the background there. I was 
even traipsing the streets, 
going into cafés and things to 
tell them about it and try and 
get them to come along on the 
day (A13). 
Client develops a 
dependency on 
the advisor for 
support and 
assistance. 
 
Intrinsic, Client Reframing To make clients realise 
they can solve many of 
their own issues. 
I think they come and they 
just want answer, they just 
want you to tell them what to 
do. Which you can’t. A lot of 
the time it is getting them to 
think about things and 
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signposting them to things or 
giving them resources so that 
they can then reach their own 
conclusion and go forward 
(A11). 
Clients assume 
the advisor is a 
source of quick 
and generous 
grant funding. 
Client, Institutional Reality check Make clients quickly 
understand they are not 
an easy source of free 
money. 
They think that you’ve got 
pots of money to give them, 
or the government does, and 
they just need to access it. 
And that they don’t have to 
do any kinds of plans or 
anything written to do that. 
They expect you, sometimes, 
to be able to do the business 
plan and financials for them 
(A5). 
Not enough 
resources to help 
everyone. 
Client, Institutional Gauging 
Mindset 
Screen out people 
without the right 
mindset. 
This is probably a bit 
controversial, but we’re all so 
keen on helping them, and of 
course we are, you want the 
entrepreneur mind-set and all 
the rest of it. But you want 
the right ones, you don’t want 
lots and lots and lots of small 
entrepreneurs who have the 
potential to… Just one or two. 
You want the ones that are 
going to be really, really 
successful (M6). 
Clients expect 
money and 
support without 
intending to meet 
obligations to 
engage with 
business advisor 
support.  
Client, Institutional and 
Intrinsic 
Laying down 
the law 
To accept clients on to a 
program and to 
minimise their 
disengagement. 
So’ when they come they get 
an engagement letter, which 
sets out the terms. You will 
engage intensively, you’ll 
open up everything, you’ll 
work with us, you, yourself 
will be built as an 
entrepreneur. And if they slip, 
a harsh word to use, we will 
move them out. Because 
there’s only room for 45 and 
they know that when they 
come in (M6). 
Advisor 
undermined or 
constrained by 
the business 
advisory 
framework. 
Intrinsic and 
Institutional 
Distancing To boost credibility and 
esteem with client by 
disassociating with the 
business advisory 
organisation. This can 
either be through 
negative or positive 
means. 
We’re always encouraged 
through the tendering process 
to be innovative, but I think 
that the level of innovation is 
suppressed. The opportunity 
to be innovative is suppressed 
because the contract does 
come with - the Business 
Gateway contract this is - 
comes with some degree of 
structure and guidance in 
order to maintain consistency 
and stats (M2). 
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Figure 2: The dynamic negotiation of public sector business advice-giving 
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